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Abstract	
The	 expansion	 of	 industrial	 mining	 in	 the	 eastern	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo	 has	 sparked	
social	mobilization	in	gold	mining	concessions,	most	of	which	are	important	sites	for	artisanal	mining.	
Congruent	with	observations	on	the	nature	of	social	movements	in	Africa,	such	mobilization	is	hyper-
fragmented	 and	 fluid.	 We	 ascribe	 this	 high	 degree	 of	 fluidity	 and	 fragmentation	 both	 to	 factors	
internal	 to	 the	 social	 mobilization	 effort,	 including	 limited	 organizational	 potential	 and	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 attitudes	 and	 discourses,	 and	 the	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 context,	
characterized	by	intense	conflicts,	patronage-based	politics,	poverty	and	repression.	Additionally,	we	
identify	 certain	 company	 practices	 as	 undermining	 the	 sustainability	 and	 coherence	 of	 social	
mobilization,	 in	 particular:	 the	 co-optation	 of	 intermediaries	 and	 protestors,	 acquiescence	 in	
practices	 of	 favoritism,	 fostering	 a	 repressive	 climate,	 and	 token	 commitment	 to	 community	
participation.	 We	 conclude	 that	 to	 understand	 social	 mobilization	 in	 mining	 concessions,	 it	 is	
important	to	study	the	interplay	between	political	(re)actions	‘from	above’	and	‘from	below’,	and	to	
recognize	 the	 diversity	 of	 these	 (re)actions,	 which	 are	 located	 on	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 between	
resistance	and	repression	on	the	one	hand,		and	collaboration	and	co-optation	on	the	other.	
	
Keywords:	industrial	mining;	social	mobilization;	conflict;	artisanal	mining;	Democratic	Republic	of	
the	Congo		
	
1. Introduction	
In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 peace	 accord	 that	 formally	 ended	 the	 Second	 Congo	 War	 (1998–2003),	
transnational	mining	companies	have	(re)started	industrial	exploration	and	production	in	the	eastern	
Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo,	 despite	 ongoing	 volatility.	 This	 intensifying	 corporate	 interest	
(especially	in	gold)	heralds	a	new	chapter	in	the	Congo’s	long	and	intricate	history	of	mining,	marked	
by	episodes	of	industrialization	and	de-industrialization,	nationalization	and	privatization,	militarized	
mining	and	artisanal	 frontier	mining	 (Bryceson	and	Geenen,	2016).	One	of	 the	defining	 features	of	
the	 most	 recent	 episode	 of	 nascent	 industrialization	 is	 tension	 between	 artisanal	 miners	 and	
transnational	companies	as	well	as	between	companies	and	communities	more	generally.	This	article	
provides	 insight	 into	 such	 tensions	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 social	 mobilization	 around	 (and	 not	
necessarily	against)	industrial	mining.		
In	 line	with	 observations	 on	 the	nature	of	 social	mobilization	 in	Africa	 (de	Waal	 and	 Ibreck,	 2013;	
Larmer,	2010),	we	observe	that	mobilization	around	industrial	mining	in	the	Congo	is	both	very	fluid	-	
rapidly	 intensifying	and	waning	over	 time	–and	extremely	 fragmented–having	 limited	coordination,	
while	 the	 involved	 groups	 pursue	 different	 goals	 and	 adopt	 diverse	 strategies	 and	 discourses.	We	
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ascribe	 this	 fragmentation	and	 fluidity	 to	both	 factors	 internal	 to	 the	mobilization	effort,	 including	
pronounced	divisions	and	limited	organizational	capacity,	and	to	contextual	factors,	in	particular	the	
salience	of	patronage-based	politics,	conflicts,	repression	and	poverty.	Additionally,	we	focus	on	the	
role	of	mining	companies,	highlighting	the	following	practices:	co-opting	local	elites	and	protestors,	
acquiescence	in	favoritism	by	local	elites,	fostering	a	climate	of	repression	and	a	more	rhetoric	than	
real	 commitment	 to	 community	 participation.	We	 contend	 that	 these	 actions	 and	 reactions	 ‘from	
above’	 often	 remain	 under-analyzed	 in	 scholarship	 on	 social	 mobilization	 around	 extractivist	
projects,	 which	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘political	 reactions	 from	 below’	 (Borras	 and	 Franco,	 2013).	
However,	to	understand	how	mobilization	unfolds,	it	is	needed	to	adopt	an	interactionist	approach,	
which	 looks	 at	 the	 interplay	 between	 political	 actions	 and	 reactions	 both	 ‘from	 below’	 and	 ‘from	
above’,	 and	 which	 situates	 these	 on	 a	 broad	 continuum	 between	 resistance/repression	 and	
collaboration/co-optation.	
Our	argument	draws	on	empirical	material	 from	two	gold	mining	concessions	 in	the	eastern	Congo	
operated	 by	 Banro	 Corporation,	 a	 Canada-based	 transnational	 company.	 Since	 the	 dynamics	 of	
mobilization	 in	 these	 concessions	 display	 important	 similarities,	 we	 have	 generalized	 the	 findings	
emerging	from	the	research	conducted	at	each	site,	rather	than	treating	them	as	comparative	case	
studies.	 Data	 were	 obtained	 through	 extensive	 fieldwork	 conducted	 periodically	 by	 the	 authors	
between	 2008	 and	 2016,	 during	 which	 interviews	 were	 held	 with	 artisanal	 miners,	 farmers,	 local	
authorities,	 security	 services,	 civil	 society	organizations	 and	mostly	Congolese	 company	 staff.	 Field	
data	 were	 complemented	 by	 and	 triangulated	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 documents	 including	 letters,	
petitions,	communications,	and	news	articles	from	Congolese	and	international	media.		
The	 article	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 draw	 on	 relevant	 literature	 on	 social	
mobilization,	specifically	in	relation	to	large-scale	mining,	to	identify	the	debates	to	which	this	article	
aims	 to	 contribute.	 Section	 3	 analyzes	 social	 mobilization	 in	 Banro’s	 concessions,	 focusing	 on	 its	
fluidity	 and	 fragmentation.	 In	 Section	 4,	 we	 provide	 explanations	 for	 the	 observed	 nature	 of	
mobilization,	 exploring	 factors	 which	 are	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 to	 the	 mobilization	 effort.	
Section	5	then	discusses	the	 influence	of	company	practices,	which	paves	the	way	for	a	concluding	
section	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 integrating	 political	 actions	 ‘from	 above’	 into	 the	 analysis	 of	 social	
mobilization	around	industrial	mining.		
	
2. Social	mobilization	and	large-scale	mining	
Social	 protest	 against	 large-scale	 mining	 is	 increasingly	 analyzed	 through	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 of	
‘social	mobilization’.	Bebbington	et	al.	(2008:	2890)	understand	such	mobilization	primarily	in	terms	
of	the	defense	of	the	material	and	immaterial	aspects	of	livelihood,	positing	that	it	aims	“to	protect	
assets	 by	 challenging	 the	 structures,	 discourses	 and	 institutions	 that	 drive	 and	permit	 exploitation	
and	 dispossession”.	 Building	 on	 this	 work,	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 literature	 analyzes	 how	 social	
mobilization	against	 large-scale	mining	 is	framed,	expressed	and	organized,	and	the	conditions	that	
shape	it	(e.g.	Kirsch,	2014;	Samorna,	2013;	Urkidi,	2010).		
Reacting	against	the	tendency	to	romanticize	‘resistance’,	or	conceptualize	it	in	a	monolithic	manner,	
the	recent	literature	on	social	mobilization	against	extractivist	projects	emphasizes	the	need	to	study	
the	entire	spectrum	of	“political	reactions	‘from	below’”	(Borras	and	Franco,	2013;	Hall	et	al.,	2015).	
This	 implies	 looking	 not	 only	 at	 different	 types	 of	 protest,	 but	 also	 at	 forms	 of	 acquiescence	 and	
mobilization	around	participation	in	decision-making	and	the	distribution	of	socio-economic	benefits.	
Attention	 to	 diversity	 also	 entails	 exploring	 social	 divisions	 and	 conflicts,	 and	 how	 these	 are	
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transformed	or	 created	by	different	 attitudes,	 interests	 and	 alliances	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 extractivist	
project	(Bebbington	et	al.,	2008;	Conde	and	Kallis,	2012;	Haalboom,	2012).		
The	call	for	recognizing	divisions	and	diversity	chimes	with	recent	literature	on	social	movements	in	
Africa,	which	emphasizes	their	limited	coherence	and	pronounced	pluriformity,	including	in	terms	of	
worldviews	 and	 mobilizing	 discourses.	 For	 Larmer	 (2010:	 252),	 this	 diversity	 indicates	 how	 these	
movements	 reflect	 “the	 contradictions	 and	 hierarchies	 of	 the	 society	 in	 which	 they	 operate”,	
including	 those	 shaped	 by	 “inequalities	 of	 resources,	 influence	 and	 education	 and	 differences	 of	
class,	 gender	 and	 ethnicity,	 amongst	 others”.	 Similarly	 emphasizing	 divisions	 and	 inequalities,	 de	
Waal	 and	 Ibreck	 (2013:	 309)	 highlight	 how	 these	 features,	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 salience	 of	
informal	 and	 personalized	 politics,	 render	 social	 movements	 susceptible	 to	 co-optation	 and	
transformation	into	“alternative	patronage	systems”.	The	resulting	fragmentation	undermines	these	
movements’	sustainability,	giving	them	an	episodic	character.	According	to	Bebbington	et	al.	(2008),	
who	 analyze	 mobilization	 around	 extractivist	 projects	 in	 other	 contexts	 in	 the	 Global	 South,	 the	
susceptibility	to	co-optation	and	acquiescence	is	also	shaped	by	economic	and	political	opportunity	
structures,	 in	particular	the	positioning	of	the	extractivist	project	within	the	 local	economy	and	the	
degrees	of	repression	encountered.	
The	political	and	socio-economic	conditions	 in	which	protest	emerges	 influence	the	possibilities	for	
the	 mobilization	 of	 financial,	 human,	 organizational,	 and	 informational	 resources	 (McCarthy	 and	
Zald,	 1977;	 2001).	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 resource	 mobilization	 theory	 as	 first	 formulated	 by	
McCarthy	and	Zald	(1977),	sustained	social	mobilization	requires	organizational	structures	capable	of	
harnessing	 financial	 and	 human	 resources.	 It	 is	 therefore	 facilitated	 by	 pre-existing	 forms	 of	
organization.	For	social	movement	theorists	highlighting	political	opportunity	structures	(McAdam	et	
al.,	2001;	Tilly	and	Tarrow,	2007),	the	ability	to	organize	and	attract	resources	 is	also	 influenced	by	
the	 relative	 strength	 of	 a	 movement’s	 domestic	 and	 international	 allies,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
political	order	 in	which	 it	 is	situated,	 including	 its	openness	to	new	political	actors	and	the	 level	of	
repression	(Tilly	and	Tarrow,	2007).		
With	 regard	 to	 extractivist	 projects,	 counter-mobilization	 is	 not	 only	 shaped	 by	 a	 country’s	
authorities,	 but	 also	 by	 company	 reactions.	 However,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 company	 is	 not	 always	
systematically	explored,	as	much	work	focuses	on	mobilization	‘from	below’.	Nevertheless,	a	growing	
body	of	 literature	 studies	 the	 strategies	and	 tactics	 that	 corporations	employ	 to	pre-empt	or	quell	
resistance,	 including	 divide	 and	 rule	 initiatives	 like	 co-optation	 and	 astroturfing,	 public	 relations	
efforts,	 lobby	campaigns,	and	direct	and	indirect	forms	of	repression	and	intimidation	(e.g.	Dunlap,	
2017;	Kraemer	et	 al.,	 2013;	 Lasslett,	 2014).	A	part	of	 this	 literature	explores	how	Corporate	 Social	
Responsibility	 (CSR)	 programs	 are	 harnessed	 within	 efforts	 to	 avoid	 or	 diffuse	 contestation	
(Bebbington	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Rajak,	 2011),	 including	 by	 enlisting	 local	 elites	 as	 “first	 line	 of	 corporate	
defense”	(Welker,	2009:	143).		
The	 focus	 on	 CSR	 and	 counter-mobilization	 reflects	 growing	 analytical	 attention	 to	 how	 corporate	
policies	shape	company-community	relations,	and	the	ways	in	which	these	policies	are	implemented	
and	experienced	(Haalboom,	2012;	Kirsch,	2014;	Welker,	2014).	This	literature	foregrounds	company	
representatives’	 agency	 when	 implementing	 corporate	 policies,	 and	 how	 these	 representatives	
interpret	 company	 guidelines	 according	 to	 their	 own	 vision.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 study	
company	 practices	 as	 actually	 enacted	 and	 not	 as	 merely	 contained	 in	 formal	 policies.	 These	
practices	 include	acquiescence	and	 inaction,	 for	not	acting	 is	also	a	choice.	 In	this	contribution,	we	
intend	 to	 account	 for	 these	 nuances,	 focusing	 on	 company	 representatives’	 actions	 and	 inactions,	
rather	than	on	 ‘company	strategies’.	The	reasons	for	this	are	also	methodological:	since	few	of	the	
observed	corporate	practices	could	be	traced	back	to	formal	policies,	and	because	the	company	staff	
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contacted	articulated	different	visions	 (cf.	Welker,	2014),	 it	was	difficult	 to	unambiguously	 identify	
‘company	strategies’	unless	a	clear	and	consistent	pattern	of	practices	could	be	detected.		
	
3. Social	mobilization	in	Banro’s	concessions	
Canada-listed	Banro	was	one	of	the	first	corporations	to	launch	activities	in	the	eastern	Congo	after	
the	 area	 formally	 passed	 from	 rebel	 to	 central	 government	 control	 in	 2003.	 After	 exploration	
activities	had	 started	around	2004-2005	 in	Namoya	 (Maniema	province)	 and	Twangiza	 (South	Kivu	
province),	a	census	of	artisanal	miners	working	and	of	households	(of	mostly	farmers	and	to	a	lesser	
extent	miners)	living	within	the	core	mining	perimeter	was	carried	out	in	2008	(see	Table	1).	A	couple	
of	 years	 later	 these	 miners	 and	 farmers	 and	 their	 families	 were	 forcefully	 displaced.	 In	 each	
concession,	a	Community	Forum	negotiated	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding	 (MoU),	which	were	
signed	 in	 2010	 (Twangiza)	 and	 2014	 (Namoya),	 respectively.	 Twangiza	 Mining	 	 (Banro	 operates	
through	subsidiaries	in	each	concession)	went	into	commercial	production	in	September	2012,	with	
Namoya	Mining	following	suit	in	January	2016.		
Throughout	 the	 different	 stages	 of	 the	 mining	 project,	 from	 exploration	 to	 development	 to	
production,	 Banro’s	 presence	 has	 generated	 various	 cycles	 of	 social	 mobilization.	 As	 further	
explained	 below,	 these	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 fluidity,	 being	 episodic	 rather	 than	 consistent,	
and	 fragmentation,	 with	 ill-coordinated	 and	 disparate	 groups	 formulating	 different	 and	 changing	
claims,	 expressed	 in	different	discourses.	One	of	 these	groups	 is	 local	 authorities,	which	differ	per	
concession.	The	Twangiza	concession	covers	four	chiefdoms	(Luhwindja,	Burhinyi,	Kaziba,	Ngweshe),	
which	 are	 headed	 by	 a	 paramount	 chief	 (mwami,	 plural:	 bami).	 Chiefdoms	 are	 subdivided	 in	
groupements	 (led	by	a	chef	de	groupement),	which	 in	 turn	consist	of	 localités,	 ruled	by	 lower-level	
chiefs.	 The	 chiefdom	 system	 is	 hierarchically	 and	 centrally	 organized	 with	 strong	 reciprocal	
relationships	between	the	mwami	and	his	‘subjects’	(Geenen	and	Claessens,	2013).	The	organization	
in	Namoya,	by	contrast,	 is	more	decentralized.	The	Namoya	concession	 is	 situated	 in	 the	sector	of	
Bangubangu	 Salambila	 (BBS),	which	 is	 an	 administrative	 entity	 at	 the	 same	 level	 as	 the	 chiefdom.	
However,	 it	 is	 led	by	a	state-appointed	chef	de	secteur	(sector	chief)	rather	than	a	customary	chief,	
although	 it	 is	 similarly	 subdivided	 in	 groupements	 and	 localités	 headed	 by	 lower-level	 customary	
authorities.		
Table	1.	Timeline	mine	development	and	social	mobilization	in	Twangiza	and	Namoya	
	 Twangiza	 Namoya	
Exploration	starts		 2005	 2004	
Community	relations	department	in	place	 2007	 2008	
Census	 of	 artisanal	 miners	 and	 households,	
announcement	of	resettlement	plans	
2008	 2008	
First	large-scale	direct	protests		 2009	 2012	
Community	Forum	in	place	 2009	 2012	
‘Cahier	de	Charges’	submitted	by	community	 	 2012	
Artisanal	miners	ordered	to	leave	concession	 2010	 2012	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	signed	with	
community	
2010	 2014	
Households	resettled	 2011	 2013	
Protests	entailing	(temporary)	occupation	of	
mining	sites	
2011	 2016	
Commercial	production	 2012	 2016	
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In	 both	 concessions,	 the	 first	 instances	 of	 widespread	 social	 mobilization	 occurred	 around	 the	
announcement	 and	 execution	 of	 involuntary	 resettlement	 plans:	 in	 Luhwindja	 chiefdom	 in	 the	
Twangiza	 concession,	 an	 estimated	 6,000	 miners	 and	 850	 households	 were	 to	 be	 displaced	 from	
Mbwega	hill;	in	Namoya	a	roughly	equal	number	of	miners	and	195	households	were	to	be	relocated	
from	 Mwendamboko	 hill.	 In	 Twangiza,	 the	 announcement	 of	 forced	 displacement	 led	 to	 violent	
protest	by	both	miners	and	farmers	in	2009.	Their	actions	were	informed	by	a	rights-based	discourse,	
in	which	livelihoods	took	center	stage.	A	community	leader	said:		
I	was	standing	first	in	line	to	fight	Banro.	Why?	Because	our	rights	had	been	violated!	To	
save	our	rights,	we	have	done	everything;	we	resisted,	we	barred	the	road.	We	claimed	
our	rights.	They	called	in	the	police	and	the	military.	But	we	told	them	we	were	prepared	
to	die.	Because	I	have	my	field	and	that’s	my	life!
1
		
Banro	 initially	 responded	with	 repression,	 putting	 so-called	 ‘troublemakers’	on	a	black	 list.	 Yet	 the	
company	 came	 under	 severe	 pressure	 to	 improve	 relations	with	 the	 community	 and	 preserve	 the	
‘social	 peace’.	 In	 2009	 they	 decided	 to	 set	 up	 a	 Community	 Forum,	 in	 which	 representatives	 of	
different	 socio-economic	 groups	 were	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 company	 over	 resettlement,	
compensation,	employment	and	community	development.	The	composition	of	the	Forum,	however,	
was	heavily	disputed.	 For	example,	 the	president	of	 the	participating	miners’	 committee	was	 soon	
discredited,	being	accused	of	 corruption	by	 some	of	 the	miners.
2
	Despite	 these	difficulties,	 a	MoU	
was	eventually	signed	on	5	June	2010,	which	ordered	the	departure	of	artisanal	miners	from	Mwana	
River	and	Kaduma	and	Lukunguri	hill.	This	measure	was	enforced	with	the	help	of	the	acting	head	of	
the	Luhwindja	chiefdom,	the	mwamikazi	(the	mwami’s	mother).	Some	miners	thereafter	reoriented	
to	alternative	economic	activities,	while	others	–	mainly	those	not	native	to	the	area	–	migrated	to	
other	sites.
3
	Hundreds	of	miners,	however,	were	not	prepared	to	leave.	In	March	2011	they	violently	
reoccupied	Kaduma	and	Lukunguri.
4
	In	early	2017,	an	estimated	2000	to	3000	miners	were	still	active	
in	Kaduma.
5
	Given	the	far-reaching	impact	of	Banro’s	presence	on	livelihoods,	it	should	come	as	no	
surprise	 that	 contentious	 action	 against	 the	 company	 has	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 a	 ‘re-possession’	 of	
artisanal	mining	sites.	
In	 Namoya,	 the	 resettlement	 process	 unfolded	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 way.	 Banro	 seems	 to	 have	
learned	lessons	from	Twangiza,	where	miners	had	re-occupied	a	part	of	the	concession	and	attempts	
to	 train	 artisanal	 miners	 for	 alternative	 activities	 had	 largely	 failed	 (partly	 because	 of	 corruption	
among	local	organizations,	see	Geenen,	2015).	In	Namoya,	Banro	negotiated	with	the	government	to	
create	 an	 artisanal	 mining	 zone	 in	 Matete,	 about	 25km	 from	 Mwendamboko.	 The	 plan	 was	 to	
support	 the	creation	of	a	miners’	 cooperative	and	collaborate	with	 international	organizations	and	
private	actors	 to	set	up	a	certification	scheme	(Banro,	2015).	On	14	September	2012,	 the	artisanal	
miners	were	given	an	ultimatum	to	 leave	the	hill	and	a	radio	message	urged	them	to	register	with	
																																								 																				
1
	Interview	community	leader,	08.01.2011.		
2
	Interview	community	leader,	08.01.2011.	
3
	A	limited	number	of	former	artisanal	miners	have	been	hired	by	labor	subcontractors	for	Banro.	In	the	initial	
phase	of	mine	development,	there	were	850	day	laborers;	mid-2017,	it	were	around	600,	only	a	part	of	whom	
was	previously	active	in	artisanal	mining.	
4
	This	occupation	happened	after	several	months	of	economic	crisis,	which	was	worsened	by	a	government-
imposed	ban	on	all	artisanal	mining	activities,	see	Geenen	(2012).		
5
	Census	carried	out	by	PhD	researcher	Ben	Radley.		
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the	cooperative	(Radio	Okapi,	2012).
6
	 In	response,	about	200	miners	marched	up	to	the	company’s	
offices.	According	 to	a	news	 report	 (Radio	Okapi,	2012),	an	 intervention	by	 the	national	police	 left	
three	miners	wounded,	which	 a	 company	 statement	 denied.
7
	 Later,	 the	 group	went	 to	 Kimbaseke	
village,	where	they	targeted	the	homes	of	company	staff,
8
	of	certain	community	leaders	considered	
traitors,
9
	 and	 of	 a	 miners’	 representative	 accused	 of	 wanting	 to	 strike	 an	 agreement	 for	 their	
dislocation.	 Indeed,	as	 in	Twangiza,	 the	artisanal	miners	held	no	agreed	position.	While	some	were	
willing	to	cooperate,	others	rejected	the	mining	project	altogether	and	did	not	respond	to	the	call	to	
leave	the	perimeter.	Consequently,	in	April	2013	a	provincial	decree	was	issued	that	gave	the	miners	
20	days	to	leave,	while	instructing	the	territorial	administrator	to	oversee	the	process.
10
	This	second	
effort	to	expel	the	miners	achieved	its	objective,	although	it	required	the	large-scale	deployment	of	
police	using	heavy-handed	tactics	including	arrests	and	the	burning	of	huts.
11
	
In	 2012	 a	 cahier	 de	 charges12	 listing	 community	 expectations	 vis-à-vis	 Banro	 in	 terms	 of	 social	
benefits	 was	 handed	 over	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Bangubangu	 Salamabila	 (BBS)	 sector.	 Two	 years	 of	
negotiations	 followed,	 culminating	 in	 the	 signing	 of	 a	MoU	 determining	 and	 prioritizing	 company	
interventions.
13
	 This	MoU	 has	 generated	 high	 expectations,	which	 by	 the	 time	 of	 our	 fieldwork	 in	
September	 2015	 had	 turned	 into	 disappointment	 and	 frustration.	 These	 feelings	 eventually	
prompted	collective	mobilization	by	 local	customary	 leaders	and	civil	society,	 leading	to	a	new	and	
more	 broad-based	 march	 protesting	 the	 ‘non-respect	 of	 the	 cahier	 de	 charges’	 in	 January	 2016.	
While	 conceived	 of	 as	 non-violent,	 the	 march	 spiraled	 out	 of	 control,	 involving	 violent	 police	
deployment	and	forms	of	property	destruction	by	the	protestors.	According	to	their	own	testimony,	
the	shooting	of	a	human	rights	activist	by	a	captain	of	the	police	unit	contracted	by	Banro	to	guard	its	
installations	prompted	the	protestors	to	temporarily	occupy	Mwendamboko	hill,	where	they	started	
to	mine.
14
	 Company	 representatives	 have	 cast	 doubt	 on	 this	 account,	 claiming	 that	 the	protestors	
first	displayed	violent	intentions	before	the	policeman	opened	fire.
15
	
From	 the	 timeline	 presented	 above,	 we	 can	 deduct	 that	 direct	 protest	 (demonstrations,	 re-
occupations,	 property	 destruction)	 peaked	 at	 specific	 moments,	 notably	 the	 announcement	 and	
implementation	of	 resettlement	plans	 and	 the	 closure	of	 artisanal	mining	 sites.	 At	 such	moments,	
																																								 																				
6
	In	July	2013	the	Association	des	filoniens	creuseurs	d’or	de	Namoya	wrote	to	the	governor	of	Maniema	to	
demand	compensation	for	investments	made	in	their	pits.	They	claimed	having	made	an	agreement	with	
Namoya	Mining	on	a	compensation	of	28.000	USD	per	pit,	which	was	never	honored	(Letter	by	Association	des	
filoniens	creuseurs	d’or	de	Namoya	to	the	Provincial	Governor,	29.07.2013).	The	company	replied	they	can	only	
compensate	owners	with	official	titles	(Namoya	Mining	Sarl,	letter	of	22.11.2013).	
7
	Banro	response	to	Salamabila	events	of	15.09.2012.	
8
	Interview	community	relations	staff	member,	11.09.2015.	
9
	Rapport	de	mission	OGP,	07.10	-	07.11.2012.	
10
	RDC,	Province	du	Maniema,	Arrêté	interministériel	des	ministres	provinciaux	
n.02/085/CAB/MINPRO/INOP/MMA/2013	et	n.	001/001/CAB/MINPRO/EME/MMA/2013	portant	mesures	
d’application	de	l’Arrêté	provincial	n.13/017/CAB/GP-MMA/2013	du	12/04/2013	portant	interdiction	de	
l’exploitation	artisanale	dans	le	périmètre	minier	de	Namoya	Mining	Sarl	dans	le	secteur	des	BB	Salamabila	en	
territoire	de	Kabambare.	
11
	Interviews	chef	de	groupement,	15.04.2016;	and	artisanal	miners,	15	and	16.06.2016.	
12	
Cahier	de	Charges	Village	Saramabila,	12.2012.	This	document	was	drafted	by	the	community	and	includes	a	
list	of	infrastructure	and	social	projects	they	want	the	company	to	execute.		
13	
Protocole	d’Accord	signé	entre	la	société	Namoya	Mining	Sarl	et	le	Secteur	de	Bangubangu	Salamabila,	
09.2014.	
14
	Memo	adressé	aux	organisations	non	gouvernementales	internationales	intervenants	dans	le	secteur	des	
ressources	naturelles	en	RDCongo,	Maniema	Libertés,	16.02.2016	;	Bulletin	hebdomadaire	sur	les	droits	
humains	dans	la	province	du	Maniema,	Maniema	Libertés,	08.02.2016..	
15
	Interview	Banro	staff	member,	23.04.2016.	
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artisanal	 miners	 joined	 forces	 with	 farmers,	 civil	 society	 and	 local	 authorities.	 In	 between	 these	
junctures	 of	 concerted	 action,	 various	 other	 forms	 of	 more	 fragmented	 contentious	 action	 took	
place,	 such	 as	 discussions	 in	 the	 Community	 Forum,	 the	 writing	 of	 letters	 and	 petitions,	 and	 the	
lobbying	 of	 national	 politicians.	 These	 activities	 were	 generally	 undertaken	 by	 individual	 interest	
groups	 represented	 in	 the	 Forum,	 many	 of	 which	 had	 not	 collaborated	 or	 constituted	 separate	
organizations	before.	As	described	 for	 the	artisanal	miners,	 some	of	 these	groups	 faced	challenges	
concerning	representation,	with	the	leadership	seen	as	failing	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	base.	
Moreover,	many	were	 internally	 divided,	 as	members	 held	 different	 attitudes	 vis-à-vis	 the	mining	
project,	 which	 also	 hampered	 collaboration	 between	 groups.	 Paradoxically,	 certain	 groups,	 like	
artisanal	miners	 and	 farmers,	 simultaneously	or	 alternately	 totally	 rejected	 the	mining	project	 and	
demanded	more	 inclusion,	 in	the	sense	of	sharing	 in	decision-making	and	potential	benefits.	These	
demands	 were	 formulated	 in	 different	 discourses,	 reflecting	 various	 worldviews	 and	 logics.	While	
some	 groups	 employed	 rights-based	 discourses	 –a	 frequent	 observation	 among	miners	 was	 “they	
just	 have	 to	 give	 us	 what	 we	 are	 entitled	 to”
16
–	 others	 drew	 upon	 discourses	 of	 belonging,	
highlighting	 their	 ancestral	 connection	with	 the	 land.	 In	 the	words	 of	 one	 trader:	 “They	 shouldn’t	
quickly	plunder	the	riches	that	our	ancestors	have	left	for	us	in	the	subsoil.”
17
	
This	 invocation	 of	 discourses	 of	 belonging	 connected	 the	 mobilization	 effort	 to	 pre-existing	
(sometimes	 latent)	 conflicts	 between	 identity	 groups	 and	 administrative	 entities,	 which	 were	
activated	or	 aggravated	by	 the	 company’s	 presence.	 This	 dynamic	was	 strongly	 visible	 in	Namoya,	
where	 different	 groups	 started	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 concession	 was	 located	 on	 their	 land,	 the	
implication	 being	 that	 they	 should	 be	 the	 primary	 recipients	 of	 compensation,	 CSR	 interventions,	
employment	and	mining	rents.	For	instance,	the	provinces	of	Maniema	and	South	Kivu	are	in	dispute	
over	where	the	Namoya	concession	is	located,	as	the	provincial	boundaries	are	allegedly	not	entirely	
clear.	There	has	also	been	considerable	debate	between	the	various	groupements	that	constitute	the	
BBS	sector,	in	particular	over	which	groupement	is	the	location	of	the	Mwendamboko	hill.18	At	sector	
level,	 there	 are	 disputes	 between	 different	 ethnic	 groups,	 with	 the	 Bangubangu	 considering	
themselves	 as	 ‘autochthones’	 (which	 is	 contested	 by	 a	 minority	 group	 named	 the	 Hongwa
19
),	 as	
opposed	 to	 Bashi	 migrants	 and	 Barega	 (coming	 from	 South	 Kivu).	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 conflicts	
between	BBS	 and	 other	 sectors	 in	Maniema	 province.
20
	 As	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 Community	 Forum	
explained:		
It	was	a	discussion	point	at	the	Forum:	who	is	the	‘affected	community’.	Some	members	said	
it	 was	 the	 entire	 Kabambare	 territory.	 Others	 said	 no.	 (…)	 Even	 people	 from	 neighboring	
territories	 came	and	made	 similar	 claims.	But	we	 stuck	 to	 the	 administrative	divisions	 and	
decided	to	go	with	the	sector	of	BBS.	But	even	now	people	are	still	making	these	claims,	and	
chiefs	come	with	their	own	cahier	de	charges.21		
In	 sum,	 the	 social	 mobilization	 effort	 was	 hampered	 by	 conflicts	 both	 between	 and	 within	 the	
different	 groups	 involved,	 which	 articulated	 distinct,	 sometimes	 competing	 visions	 and	 demands	
towards	the	company.		
	
	
																																								 																				
16
	Group	interview	miners,	15.09.201	
17
	Group	interview	traders,	11.09.2015.	
18
	Interview	journalist,	12.09.2015.		
19
	Interview	youth	leader,	14.09.2015.		
20
	Interview	civil	society	activist,	15.04.2016.		
21
	Interview	Banro	staff	member,	08.09.2015.		
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4.	Explaining	fragmentation	and	fluidity	
In	the	previous	section,	we	have	described	how	social	mobilization	in	Banro’s	concessions	is	marked	
by	 unsteady	 coalitions,	 incidental	 coordination,	 the	 episodic	 visibility	 of	 contentious	 action,	 and	
divergent	and	changing	attitudes	and	discourses.	In	this	section,	we	further	explore	the	reasons	for	
this	fluidity	and	fragmentation,	locating	these	in	the	capacities	of	different	groups	(in	casu	artisanal	
miners,	civil	society,	and	local	authorities	and	elites)	to	organize	and	coordinate	mobilization,	and	the	
ways	these	capacities	are	shaped	by	the	socio-economic	and	political	environment.	
The	 existence	 of	 seemingly	 contradictory	 and	 often	 changing	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 company	 (for	
instance	rejecting	 its	presence,	but	simultaneously	or	alternately	demanding	a	greater	share	of	the	
benefits)	 should	 first	 of	 all	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 extremely	 precarious	 socio-economic	
conditions	in	the	Congo.	This	situation	drives	both	elites	and	non-elites	to	seize	any	opportunity	they	
encounter,	 inducing	an	orientation	towards	immediate	and	individual	gain,	rather	than	longer-term	
collective	benefits,	which	in	turn	fuels	conflicts	and	competition	(Verweijen,	2015).	
Ongoing	 conflicts	 are	 also	 related	 to	 pre-existing	 divisions	 between	 different	 identity	 groups	 and	
administrative	entities,	as	illustrated	above,	and	the	salience	of	certain	conflict-inducing	narratives.	A	
prime	example	is	the	autochthony	discourse,	which	pits	‘foreigners’	or	‘immigrants’	against	the	‘first’	
or	‘original’	inhabitants	of	a	place	(Jackson,	2006).	Another	factor	fostering	conflicts	is	the	salience	of	
patronage-based	politics	within	the	Congo’s	political	order,	which	is	marked	by	ongoing	competition	
between	 different	 patronage	 networks	 (Trefon,	 2011).	 While	 such	 networks	 can	 provide	 an	
organizational	 framework	 for	 mobilization,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 protests	 against	 industrial	 mining,	 they	
often	 end	 up	 undermining	 the	 coherence	 of	mobilization	 efforts,	 as	 they	 cut	 across	 the	 different	
professional	and	other	 interest	groups	 involved.	Additionally,	patronage	politics	 fosters	a	penchant	
for	 co-optation,	 implying	 the	 granting	 of	 access	 to	 favors	 in	 exchange	 for	 loyalty,	 which	 leads	 to	
unstable	positions	among	local	leaders	(Verweijen,	2015;	2016).		
A	 final	dimension	of	 the	political	order	 that	affects	 the	nature	of	 social	mobilization	 is	 the	 relative	
degree	of	freedom	of	expression	and	political	organization.	While	political	repression	in	the	Congo	is	
neither	absolute	nor	systematic,	there	is	not	an	open	climate	in	which	civil	 liberties	are	guaranteed	
(Trefon,	2011).	The	nature	of	the	security	services,	which	rely	on	deterrence	rather	than	systematic	
monitoring	and	timely	intervention,	further	circumscribes	possibilities	for	contentious	action,	causing	
people	 to	 anticipate	 disproportionate	 and	 arbitrary	 repression	 (Verweijen,	 2015).	 Heavy-handed	
interventions	also	contribute	to	the	fluidity	of	social	mobilization,	as	they	make	people	quickly	refrain	
from	further	action	out	of	fear.			
This	 broader	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 context	 shapes	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	
contentious	 action	 and	 the	 involved	 groups’	 capabilities	 for	 mobilizing	 resources.	 In	 Namoya	 and	
Twangiza,	none	of	these	groups	has	substantial	financial	resources,	 impairing	their	activities.	This	 is	
particularly	the	case	for	the	committees	of	artisanal	miners,	which	moreover	lack	bargaining	power.	
Collective	 action	 by	 artisanal	miners	 has	 been	 further	 undermined	 by	 this	 group’s	 diversity.	While	
some	miners	are	from	the	concession	area	and	prefer	to	stay	there,	others	come	from	afar	and	are	
relatively	mobile,	 periodically	 changing	mining	 sites	 or	 jobs.	 Additionally,	 when	 resettlement	 took	
place,	 the	miners	became	dispersed	and	divided.	For	example,	after	 the	closure	of	Mwendamboko	
hill	 in	Namoya,	 some	moved	 to	artisanal	mining	 sites	 further	away,	 like	Misisi	 in	South	Kivu,	while	
others	 continued	 to	 dig	 in	 or	 around	Banro’s	 concessions,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 caught.	 Yet	
other	miners	left	the	mining	sector	altogether,	trying	to	earn	an	income	in	a	different	way.	A	fourth,	
relatively	small	group,	joined	the	mining	and	agricultural	cooperatives	created	with	the	assistance	of	
Banro	 to	 help	 convert	 the	 miners	 to	 alternative	 livelihoods.	 While	 the	 mining	 cooperative	 has	
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received	 (limited)	material	 support,	 they	 are	 struggling	 to	 access	 gold,	which	 is	much	 scarcer	 and	
deeper	 underground	 than	 where	 they	 used	 to	 dig.	 In	 addition	 to	 frustrations	 about	 Banro’s	
unfulfilled	 promises,	 cooperative	 members	 also	 feel	 the	 contempt	 of	 non-members:	 “We	 are	
supposed	to	be	examples	for	the	rest	of	the	community.	The	company	should	embrace	us.	But	today	
we,	as	well	as	those	who	disagreed	with	us,	we	are	all	in	the	same	situation.	They	begin	to	make	fun	
of	 us”.
22
	 Finally,	 as	 in	 Twangiza,	 the	 unity	 of	 miners	 in	 Namoya	 has	 been	 undermined	 by	
disagreements	 over	 representation,	 which	 were	 aggravated	 by	 company	 efforts	 to	 co-opt	 their	
leaders,	as	further	discussed	below.		
The	issues	of	contested	leadership	and	limited	resources	have	also	hampered	the	mobilizing	capacity	
of	 civil	 society	 organizations	 in	Namoya,	which	 are	 united	 in	 a	 platform	with	 an	 elected	 president	
that	 is	 simply	 known	 as	 société	 civile	 (civil	 society).	 Another	 factor	 affecting	 these	 organizations’	
mobilizing	 capacity	 is	 their	 relative	 isolation.	Namoya	 is	weakly	 connected	 to	 the	provincial	 power	
centers	of	Kindu	(Maniema)	and	–despite	the	recent	rehabilitation	of	the	road	towards	Uvira–Bukavu	
(South	Kivu).	Internet	has	only	recently	become	accessible,	with	the	rise	of	cell	phone	network-based	
access.	 In	 combination	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 highly	 educated	members,	 this	 isolation	 partly	 explains	 the	
absence	 of	 NGOs	 with	 international	 funding	 and	 good	 connections	 with	 (trans)national	 advocacy	
networks.	 Twangiza,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 only	 a	 two	 hours’	 drive	 from	 Bukavu.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	
location	 enhances	 opportunities	 for	 social	 mobilization,	 providing	 access	 to	 political,	 human	 and	
financial	 resources.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 intensifies	 local	 associations’	 connection	 to	 the	 interests	
and	 conflicts	 of	 urban-based	 elites.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 we	 show	 how	 the	 availability	 of	
resources	and	 influential	allies	did	not	enable	stronger	coordination	 in	Twangiza,	but	 rendered	 the	
mobilization	effort	subject	to	diverging	elite	agendas	(cf.	Verweijen,	2017).		
As	with	civil	society	organizations,	local	authorities	and	other	elites	have	displayed	limited	coherence	
in	 their	mobilization	 efforts,	 reflecting	 their	 heterogeneity	 and	 the	 changing	 dynamics	 of	 alliance-
making.	 In	 Twangiza,	 Banro	 decided	 to	 closely	 collaborate	 with	 the	 chiefs,	 in	 particular	 the	
mwamikazi	of	Luhwindja.	When	they	asked	her	to	facilitate	the	company’s	installation	in	2005,	they	
actually	 played	 into	 an	 ongoing	 succession	 conflict	 between	 and	 within	 two	 rivaling	 families,	
reinforcing	 the	 mwamikazi’s	 position	 while	 sidelining	 her	 competitors	 (Geenen,	 2015).	 The	
mwamikazi	 subsequently	 gained	 additional	 political	 clout	 (by	 being	 co-opted	 into	 the	 provincial	
parliament	 after	 the	2006	elections)	 and	economic	power	 (by	winning	 contracts	 from	Banro).	 This	
further	sparked	opposition	against	her	and	gave	this	opposition	an	 increasingly	political	and	supra-
local	dimension.	An	important	catalyst	of	these	developments	was	Codelu,	a	group	of	Bukavu-based	
elites	 from	 Luhwindja	 that	 was	 initially	 supportive	 of	 the	 Banro/mwamikazi	 alliance,	 not	 least	
because	 some	 of	 its	 members	 had	 won	 contracts	 to	 build	 community	 infrastructure	 or	 organize	
training	for	former	miners.	Around	2011	however,	when	some	of	these	contracts	were	not	renewed,	
Codelu	started	to	mobilize	against	the	mwamikazi	and	won	political	support	from	provincial	as	well	
as	national	politicians.	It	also	supported	a	petition	organized	in	2012	that	called	for	the	mwamikazi’s	
abdication.
23
	 In	 the	aftermath,	 two	 leaders	of	 the	organization	 that	had	 initiated	 the	petition	were	
arrested.	 These	 events	 prompted	 Codelu	 to	 openly	 accuse	 the	mwamikazi	 of	 bad	management,24	
																																								 																				
22
	Interview	member	of	cooperative,	10.09.2015.		
23
	 Pétition	 de	 la	 population	 de	 Luhwindja	 contre	Madame	 Espérance	M’Baharanyi	 La	 Namunene,	 2012.	The	
petition	collected	4044	signatures,	although	some	people	 later	protested	because	 they	 found	 their	name	on	
the	document	without	having	signed.		
24
	Letter	from	CODELU	to	Banro,	Retrait	de	la	confiance	de	la	population	de	Luhwindja	à	Madame	Espérance	
M’Baharanyi,	28.03.2012.	
	 10	
while	 another	 group	 of	 Bukavu-based	 elites	 from	 Luhwindja	 started	 blaming	 Codelu	 in	 turn.
25
	 At	
about	the	same	time,	a	family	that	has	been	a	rival	to	the	Luhwindja	throne	for	decades	began	to	tap	
into	 these	 existing	 divisions	 to	 reinforce	 its	 position.
26
	 In	 2015	 they	were	 accused	 of	 organizing	 a	
violent	attack	on	the	residence	of	the	mwami,	who	by	then	had	formally	taken	over	power.27	After	
this	attack,	 the	mwamikazi	 also	openly	voiced	criticism	against	Banro.28	 These	developments	 show	
not	only	how	local	elites’	positions	towards	the	company	changed	in	response	to	company	practices,	
such	as	granting	contracts	and	seats	at	the	negotiation	table,	but	also	how	these	positions	affected	
their	legitimacy.	This	last	dimension,	in	turn,	influenced	social	mobilization,	hampering	the	ability	of	
particular	local	elites	to	mobilize	the	population	while	enhancing	their	opponents’	capabilities	to	do	
so.	The	situation	in	Luhwindja	thus	illustrates	how	social	mobilization	is	both	shaped	by	and	shapes	
broader	struggles	over	authority.		
In	 Namoya,	 where	 there	 are	 only	 lower-level	 (groupement)	 chiefs	 who	 lack	 direct	 political	
connections	 in	Kinshasa,	Banro	chose	to	collaborate	primarily	with	the	chief	of	the	BBS	sector.	The	
latter	 has	 close	 ties	 to	 the	 governor	 of	 Maniema	 province,	 who	 is	 in	 turn	 co-opted	 into	 the	
presidential	circle.	Banro’s	cozy	relations	with	the	sector	chief	have	led	the	lower-level	chiefs	to	feel	
frustrated,	believing	their	authority	and	rights	are	being	ignored.	One	chief	complained	for	example	
that	the	cahier	de	charges	was	imposed	upon	them.29	Another	expressed	his	frustration	as	follows:		
I	am	chief	here,	owner	of	the	land	they	work	on.	But	since	they	have	arrived,	they	have	done	
nothing	 but	 lie	 to	 me.	 They	 tell	 me	 to	 wait	 for	 my	 contribution	 until	 they’ll	 be	 in	 the	
production	phase.	But	they	are	producing!	They	think	I	am	a	‘little	man’.	But	this	is	my	land	!	
I	manage	 this	 youth,	 who	 is	 about	 to	make	 troubles	 here.	We	 see	 them	 [Banro]	 as	mere	
thieves.
30
		
Although	framed	in	discourses	of	rights	linked	to	customary	ownership,	these	claims	are	also	about	a	
loss	of	 income,	as	the	chiefs	used	to	benefit	from	customary	taxes	on	artisanal	mining.	Deprived	of	
their	 income	 and	 power,	 the	 bami	 have	 tried	 to	 redress	 the	 situation	 by	 making	 demands	 for	
inclusion	(they	presented,	for	example,	their	own	cahier	de	charges	and	created	labor	hire	or	service	
companies	 to	be	 contracted	by	Banro)	 and	by	 seizing	upon	existing	 social	mobilization	against	 the	
company.	Thus,	they	started	to	voice	the	same	grievances	as	the	population,	thereby	reinforcing	the	
idea	of	being	their	 ‘real	 representatives’.	At	 the	same	time,	 they	accused	competing	 local	elites,	 in	
particular	 the	 sector	 chief,	 of	 complicity	 with	 alleged	 malpractices	 of	 the	 company.	 In	 2016,	 the	
sector	chief	was	suspended	by	the	then	Prime	Minister	regarding	accusations	of	bad	management	of	
the	January	march	that	had	turned	violent.	The	customary	chiefs	have	tried	to	take	advantage	of	the	
suspension	to	reinforce	their	own	position.		
To	 conclude,	 the	 different	 groups	 involved	 in	 social	mobilization	 around	 Banro	 often	 have	 limited	
pre-existing	organizational	structures;	lack	adequate	financial	and	human	resources;	are	embroiled	in	
internal	conflicts;	and	are	at	times	dominated	by	elites	involved	in	local	power	struggles	who	display	
inconsistent	 attitudes.	 Reflecting	 their	 evolving	 relations	 with	 the	 company,	 local	 elites	 tend	 to	
change	 their	 position	 strategically,	 for	 instance	 first	 presenting	 themselves	 as	 loyal	 intermediaries	
																																								 																				
25
	Letter	from	‘Intellectuels	et	amis	du	mwami’,	Notre	réaction	aux	impertinences	continues	dans	la	lettre	vous	
addressée	par	la	Codelu	en	date	du	11	septembre	2012,	21.09.2012.	
26
	Letter	from	Ruvura	family,	Rappel	de	notre	demande	d’intervention	dossier	mwami	Ruvura,	30.04.2012.	
27
	One	member	of	the	rivalling	family	has	been	convicted	by	the	Military	Tribunal;	the	case	is	now	in	appeal.	
Interview	lawyer,	15.04.2017.	
28
	Interview	chief,	08.04.2017.	
29
	Interview	chef	de	localité,	15.09.2015.	
30
	Interview	chef	de	localité,	10.09.2015.	
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and	then	as	able	to	unleash	and	channel	popular	anti-company	sentiments.	Second,	 local	elites	are	
embedded	in	wider	power	networks,	whether	on	a	patronage	basis	or	as	part	of	formal	hierarchies,	
the	changing	dynamics	of	which	shape	their	participation	in	social	mobilization.	Third,	elites’	position	
towards	 the	company	 is	affected	by	 the	waxing	and	waning	of	 their	 local	 legitimacy,	which	 in	 turn	
influences	their	engagement	in	social	mobilization.		
	
5.	Political	(re)actions	‘from	above’	
The	fluid	and	fragmented	nature	of	social	mobilization	in	Banro’s	concessions	is	not	merely	a	product	
of	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 context,	 or	 the	 features	 of	 the	 mobilizing	 groups.	 Certain	
company	 practices	 intensify	 the	 factors	 that	 undermine	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	 social	
mobilization,	for	instance	by	promoting	rapidly	changing	attitudes	towards	the	company	or	a	climate	
of	fear.	In	this	section	we	analyze	four	such	practices:	the	co-optation	of	local	leaders	and	dissenters;	
acquiescence	 of	 favoritism	 related	 to	 access	 to	 benefits;	 fostering	 a	 climate	 of	 repression;	 and	
rhetorical	rather	than	real	commitment	towards	community	participation.		
Reflecting	local	political	logics,	Banro	generally	engages	in	co-optation.	A	staff	member	of	its	Human	
Resources	 department	 explained	 for	 instance	 that	 service	 and	 labor	 hire	 contracts	 are	 preferably	
granted	 to	 local	 elites,	 not	 because	 they	 offer	 the	 highest	 quality	 services,	 but	 to	 keep	 them	
satisfied.
31
	Additionally,	in	its	concessions,	the	company	tends	to	rely	on	a	few	local	authorities	who	
are	 loyal	 to	 them	 and	 act	 as	 intermediaries	 towards	 the	 community.	 It	 counts	 on	 these	
intermediaries	to	enforce	decisions,	manage	dissent	and	handle	competing	authorities.	By	becoming	
privileged	 channels	 of	 influence	 and	 resources,	 these	 co-opted	 authorities	 often	 see	 their	 power	
position	 significantly	 reinforced.	 Having	 the	 backing	 of	 the	 company,	 however,	 they	 also	 tend	 to	
become	less	accountable	to	their	subjects.	 In	the	words	of	one	focus	group	participant	 in	Namoya:	
“The	sector	chief	regularly	receives	‘envelopes’.	So	when	he	takes	a	position	in	defense	of	his	people,	
they	[Banro]	call	him	at	their	offices,	and	when	he	returns	he	pleads	in	favor	of	Banro.”
32
	As	the	case	
of	the	mwamikazi	illustrates,	enduring	co-optation	may	lead	authorities	to	become	contested,	which	
in	turn	fosters	fragmentation.	
Co-optation	also	promotes	favoritism,	as	those	co-opted	by	the	company	may	use	their	influence	to	
favor	 their	 own	 network,	 particularly	 when	 it	 pertains	 to	 access	 to	 jobs.	 	 According	 to	 the	 MoU	
signed	 in	Namoya:	“The	company	as	well	as	 its	subcontractors	give	priority	to	 local	manpower	and	
will	do	its	best	to	distribute	jobs	fairly	among	the	different	towns	and	villages”.
33
	Fair	distribution	was	
to	 be	 achieved	 through	 setting	 up	 a	 sub-committee	 within	 the	 Community	 Forum	 that	 had	 to	
monitor	 the	 recruitment	process	and	determine	people’s	origins.	However,	 since	 the	 identification	
process	is	based	on	unclear	criteria,	it	is	easily	manipulated.	As	a	businessman	in	Salamabila	stated:	
“The	majority	of	people	who	work	here	are	Bashi.	They	buy	certificates	that	they	originate	from	here	
from	the	sector	chief.	He	sells	those	for	his	personal	profit”.34	Other	informants,	including	Banro	staff	
members,	confirmed	this,	stating	that	people	from	Bukavu	pay	a	few	hundred	dollars	“to	be	put	on	
the	 list”
35
	and	 that	you	need	to	be	“close	 to	 the	sector	chief”	 in	order	 to	get	a	 job.36	Despite	 their	
awareness	 of	 the	 danger	 of	 perceptions	 of	 bias	 and	 corruption,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 their	 careful	
																																								 																				
31
	Interview	Human	Resources	staff	member,	15.04.2017.		
32
	Group	interview	local	leaders,	09.09.2015.		
33
	Protocole	d’Accord	signé	entre	la	société	Namoya	Mining	Sarl	et	le	Secteur	de	Bangubangu	Salamabila,	2014.	
34
	Interview	president	FEC	Salamabila,	16.04.2016.	
35
	Interview	Banro	staff	member,	05.12.2016.	See	also	group	interview	youth,	15.09.2015.		
36
	Group	interview	teachers,	09.09.2015.	
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attempts	 to	 engage	more	with	 ‘opposition	 forces’	 in	 Luhwindja,	 Banro’s	 community	 relations	 staff	
appears	to	do	little	to	correct	practices	of	favoritism	of	key	intermediaries.	Hence,	‘lessons	learned’	
in	Twangiza	have	not	led	to	significant	changes	in	Namoya.	This	inaction	contributes	to	polarization	
between	on	the	one	hand,	those	within	the	networks	of	co-opted	elites,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	
less	privileged	situated	outside	of	them.	
Aside	from	local	leaders,	the	company	also	co-opts	dissenters,	commonly	by	offering	them	jobs	and	
other	advantages.	As	a	local	leader	explained:	“(…)	since	Banro’s	arrival,	civil	society	members	have	
become	easily	corruptible:	an	envelope	suffices	for	them	to	shut	up.	Just	to	give	you	an	example:	the	
last	two	presidents	of	civil	society	have	been	employed	by	Banro,	and	since,	they	have	never	spoken	
again.”
37
	 In	another	interview,	participants	said:	“They	are	smart.	Whenever	they	have	trouble	with	
the	population,	they	identify	the	main	troublemaker	and	quickly	call	him	in	order	to	buy	him	off.	Try	
to	organize	a	march	against	Banro	today,	tomorrow	they	will	give	you	a	job.”
38
	In	a	similar	vein,	the	
company	tried	to	reduce	resistance	among	the	artisanal	miners	by	co-opting	certain	key	figures.	For	
instance,	 the	 person	 designated	 to	 be	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 artisanal	miners	 in	 Namoya,	who	
initially	strongly	resisted	the	closure	of	the	mining	sites,	was	offered	the	post	of	president	of	the	new	
miners’	 cooperative	 created	 with	 Banro’s	 help.	 This	 representative	 has	 since	 become	 heavily	
criticized,	 because	 of	 alleged	 connivance	 with	 certain	 powerful	 higher	 authorities	 reported	 to	 be	
close	to	the	provincial	governor.
39
	As	one	local	authority	commented:	“The	mining	cooperative	was	a	
creation	of	the	number	one	of	the	province,	the	sector	chief	and	Banro.	They	have	imposed	a	person	
[as	its	leader]	who	is	contested	by	the	population	and	by	the	artisanal	miners.”
40
	In	2016,	the	same	
representative	 even	 created	 a	 service	 company	 for	 cutting	 and	 processing	 wood	 in	 the	 Namoya	
concession	and	signed	a	contract	with	Banro,	reflecting	his	privileged	position.
41
	
Co-optation	typically	 interacts	with	coercion.	While	our	findings	do	not	 indicate	that	the	repression	
of	 contentious	 action	 is	 company	 policy,	 we	 do	 conclude	 that	 Banro’s	 practices	 contribute	 to	
fostering	 a	 climate	 in	 which	 repression	 is	 a	 regular	 occurrence.	 The	 company	 takes	 for	 instance	
limited	initiatives	to	prevent	or	follow	up	on	incidents	by	the	Congolese	police	staff	that	it	contracts,	
like	pressing	for	changing	abusive	units.	To	secure	its	installations,	Banro	contracts	units	of	the	PNC	
(Congolese	 police)	 and	 private	 security	 contractors	 (at	 present	 G4S)	 (Hönke,	 2014).	 While	 these	
contractors	 are	 charged	 with	 conducting	 human	 rights	 training	 to	 ensure	 the	 correct	 behavior	 of	
Congolese	 security	 staff,	 the	 training	 is	 reported	 to	 be	 of	 low	 quality.	 As	 a	 former	 employee	 of	 a	
private	security	contractor	explained:	
Banro	 does	 not	 organize	 much	 training	 in	 human	 rights	 for	 the	 GMI	 [Groupe	 Mobile	
d’Intervention,	 the	 police	 unit	 that	 attaches	 its	 staff	 to	 Banro].	 Previously,	 there	 was	
personnel	 [from	 the	 contractor]	 providing	 training,	 like	 first	 aid;	 how	 to	 deal	 with	
manifestations,	how	to	handle	workers	in	case	of	unrest;	how	to	deal	with	theft	(….)	At	that	
time,	there	were	much	less	incidents	(…)	Now	there	are	too	many	misdemeanors;	the	police	
staff	is	badly	supervised.
42
		
Local	human	rights	organizations	and	artisanal	miners	confirmed	these	observations,	describing	how	
those	 searching	 for	 minerals	 in	 and	 around	 the	 concessions,	 even	 at	 considerable	 distance,	
																																								 																				
37
	Group	interview	local	leaders,	09.09.2015,	see	also	group	interview	traders,	11.09.2015	and	interview	youth	
leader,	14.09.2015.	
38
	Group	interview	traders,	11.09.2015.		
39
	Interview	deputy	leader	of	artisanal	miners	in	Namoya,	17.04.2016.	
40
	Interview	local	authority,	16.04.2016.	
41
	Interview	Namoya	Mining	staff	member,	15.04.2017.	
42
	Interview	ex-security	employee,	15.04.2016.	
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frequently	face	beatings,	intimidation	and	arrest.
43
		As	one	miner	explained:	“If	they	catch	you,	they	
seriously	hit	you.	Or	they	put	you	in	prison.	That	happens	almost	every	day.	They	put	somebody	in	
prison,	we	pay	and	they	release	him”.
44
	According	to	several	interlocutors,	arresting	artisanal	miners	
has	become	an	 important	 source	of	 income	 for	 security	 staff.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	practices	
undermine	 the	 credibility	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 staff,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 limited	 efforts	 from	 the	
company	to	prevent	or	sanction	them.	
The	 company	 has	 also	 been	 criticized	 for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 has	 handled	 the	 violent	 events	 in	
Namoya	 in	 January	 2016,	 when	 a	 captain	 of	 the	 GMI	 unit	 contracted	 by	 Banro	 opened	 fire	 on	 a	
crowd	 of	 protestors,	 leading	 to	 the	 death	 of	 a	 human	 rights	 activist.	 While	 Banro	 deferred	 all	
responsibility,	saying	they	did	not	give	the	orders,
45
	a	ruling	of	the	Tribunal	Militaire	de	Garnison	(a	
military	court,	which	in	the	Congo	has	jurisdiction	over	police	personnel)	assigned	the	company	civil	
responsibility	 and	 imposed	 hefty	 reparations	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 victim’s	 family.	 However,	 as	 the	
company	 is	 waiting	 for	 the	 appeal	 to	 this	 ruling	 introduced	 at	 the	 military	 court	 in	 Kindu,	 the	
impression	emerged	that	it	is	not	doing	anything	to	help	this	family.	The	company	also	threatened	to	
sue	 those	 who	 organized	 the	 January	 march,	 namely,	 the	 civil	 society	 president,	 the	 customary	
chiefs,	 and	 the	 local	 community	 radio	 station,	 accused	 of	 inciting	 the	 protestors	 to	 attack	 the	
company’s	property.	The	plans	 to	sue	were	widely	denounced	and	seen	as	an	 infringement	on	the	
freedom	of	expression	and	assembly.
46
	While	the	company	never	followed	through	on	the	threat,	the	
announcement	did	exacerbate	tension	and	fear.	In	the	eyes	of	many	community	members,	who	were	
deeply	shocked	by	the	violence,	Banro	also	failed	to	engage	in	other	efforts	to	calm	the	situation,	like	
confidence-building	measures.
47
	By	contrast,	certain	company	representatives	justified	the	actions	of	
the	GMI	unit,	alleging	 that	 the	demonstrators	were	violent.	 In	 the	words	of	a	community	 relations	
person:	 “They	organized	 a	 so-called	 sit-in	 but	with	machetes	 and	whips;	 that	 is	 not	 a	 sit-in.	 These	
policemen	 are	 not	 foolish,	 he	 [captain]	 has	 engaged	 in	 legitimate	 self-defense”.
48
	 This	 same	
representative	 commented	 that	 the	 people	 in	 Namoya	were	 ‘disagreeable’	 [antipathiques],	 which	
provides	some	 insight	 into	why	 limited	action	has	been	undertaken	to	mend	relations	and	prevent	
security	staff	continuing	to	engage	in	violent	actions.	
That	 Banro’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 January	 events	was	 counterproductive	 is	 proven	 by	 escalation	 in	 the	
following	months,	as	armed	bands	started	to	attack	company	property.	In	September	2016,	six	trucks	
were	 burned	 close	 to	 Namoya	 in	 an	 attack	 on	 a	 convoy	 transporting	 fuel	 and	mining	 equipment	
(Wilson,	 2016).	 On	 31	 December	 2016,	 a	 similar	 attack	 targeted	 two	 vehicles	 of	 Banro’s	
subcontractor	CIVICON	(Radio	Okapi,	2017).	 In	March	2017,	 five	workers	were	kidnapped	(Reuters,	
2017)	and	in	May	that	year	“a	series	of	attacks	on	police	and	military	personnel	in	the	village	areas	
surrounding	 the	 mine”	 took	 place,	 together	 with	 an	 attempt	 to	 invade	 the	 camp,	 prompting	 the	
company	to	evacuate	its	staff	and	temporarily	suspend	its	operations.
49
	In	this	respect,	the	words	of	
a	focus	group	participant	in	September	2015	sound	ominous:		
We	say	there	is	nothing	positive	because	they	don’t	respect	our	rights.	Banro	has	taken	our	
land	 away.	We	 cannot	 farm,	mine,	 fish,	 nor	 hunt.	We	 cannot	do	 anything	 since	Banro	has	
																																								 																				
43
	Group	interview	female	farmers,	13.09.2015,	interview	member	Community	Forum	09.09.2015	and	group	
interview	civil	society	10.09.2015.		
44
	Group	interview	miners,	15.09.2015.	
45
	Interview	Banro	staff	member,	05.12.2016.		
46
	Lettre	d’information	de	la	société	civile	sous	antenne	de	Salamabila	sur	les	actes	de	provocation	de	la	société	
Namoya	Mining	contre	les	représentants	communautaire	du	secteur	des	B.B.	Salamabila,	11.03.2016.		
47
	Interview	local	leaders,	15.04.2016,	interview	civil	society	representatives,	15	and	16.04.2016.	
48
	Interview	community	relations	staff	member,	22.04.2016.	
49
	Press	release,	Banro	reports	incident	at	its	Namoya	mine	site,	18.05.2017.	
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taken	everything.	That	is	how	rebellions	are	born.	[…]	Remember:	there	will	be	a	rebellion	in	
Salamabila.	We	just	claim	our	rights.
50
		
Yet	 these	words	 should	not	 be	 read	 as	 an	 endorsement	 of	 the	 recent	 violent	 actions,	which	were	
carried	 out	 by	 armed	 groups,	 and	 not	 by	 community	members.	 In	 fact,	 the	 involvement	 of	 these	
groups	 has	 created	 further	 divisions:	while	 some	 sympathize	with	 them,	 albeit	 in	 varying	 degrees,	
many	do	not	support	their	actions	(Verweijen,	2017).	
A	 final	 way	 in	 which	 Banro	 practices	 negatively	 affect	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	 social	
mobilization	 is	 by	 the	 company’s	 approach	 to	 community	 participation.	 While	 Banro	 formally	
upholds	 its	CSR	obligations	and	 is	publicly	praised	 for	 it,
51
	 some	of	 the	 initiatives	seem	to	be	more	
façades	than	the	product	of	genuine	commitment.	One	example	is	the	pledge	to	foster	‘community	
participation’,	a	pillar	of	‘best	practices’	in	CSR	(Wilson	et	al.,	2016)	and	a	key	feature	in	all	of	Banro’s	
Sustainability	Reports.	Supposedly,	the	most	 important	catalyzer	for	community	participation	is	the	
Community	Forum.	However,	as	described,	there	are	serious	issues	around	the	representativeness	of	
Forum	 participants.	 Furthermore,	 we	 have	 documented	 a	 case	 in	 which	 a	 decision	 made	 by	 the	
Forum	was	 ‘overruled’	 by	 a	 staff	member	 of	 the	 Banro	 Foundation,	 the	 company’s	 ‘development’	
arm,	because	the	 latter	believed	he	knew	what	was	‘best’	 for	the	community.	While	the	MoU	with	
the	BBS	sector	identified	building	a	technical	school	as	a	priority	intervention,	the	staff	member	told	
he	was	dissuading	 this	 initiative	because	 (he	believed)	 it	would	not	work	and	was	 too	expensive.
52
	
Whereas	this	attitude	might	be	informed	by	previous	experiences	with	development	interventions,	it	
also	indicates	a	paternalist	reflex	that	combines	oddly	with	the	emphasis	on	community	participation	
and	 empowerment.	 This	 penchant	 for	 paternalism	 is	 further	 corroborated	 by	 this	 staff	 member’s	
views	on	the	local	population	in	a	village	where	the	Banro	Foundation’s	development	initiatives	were	
not	well	received	by	the	inhabitants.
53
	As	he	commented:	“But	they	are	lazy	[ce	sont	des	paresseux],	I	
do	not	give	anything	 for	nothing,	 you	have	 to	work	 for	 it	 (..)	 they	do	not	understand,	 they	do	not	
want	 to	work.”
54
	 Fostering	community	participation	 is	apparently	also	hindered	by	company	staff’s	
perceptions	 of	 local	 associations	 as	 only	 pursuing	 self-interest.	 As	 a	 former	 community	 relations	
officer	commented	on	Namoya:	“There	is	no	credible	local	association	there.	We	never	worked	with	
any	community-based	organization	as	they	were	all	created	ad	hoc.”
55
	
While	 token	 commitment	 to	 participation	 would	 seem	 to	 provoke	 generalized	 discontent	 and	
therefore	 strengthen	 the	 coherence	 of	 social	 mobilization,	 in	 practice,	 it	 tends	 to	 foster	 further	
fragmentation,	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 in	 their	 desire	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 eventual	 benefits,	 the	
‘loyalists’	tend	to	adopt	the	point	of	view	proposed	by	company	representatives,	while	others	stick	to	
their	 original	 position	 or	 criticize	 the	 company	 for	 not	 living	 up	 to	 its	 promises.	 Second,	 if	
interventions	proposed	by	the	Community	Forum	never	materialize,	the	legitimacy	of	this	Forum	and	
hence	 the	 desirability	 of	 allying	 with	 them	may	 be	 questioned	 both	 by	 the	 base	 of	 the	 different	
interest	groups	represented,	who	often	already	heavily	distrust	their	leaders,	and	by	the	population	
at	 large.	 Clearly,	 limited	 legitimacy	 undermines	 the	 Forum’s	 capacity	 to	mobilize	 its	 members	 for	
collective	action	towards	the	company.		
																																								 																				
50
	Group	interview	miners,	15.09.2015.	
51
	In	2015	the	company	won	the	award	for	‘best	social	investment	programs’	in	the	DRC,	and	in	2016	for	
‘community	development	and	local	content’	at	the	DRC	Mining	Industry	Week,	see	Press	Release,	13.06.2016.		
52
	Interview	Banro	Foundation	staff	member,	10.09.2015.	
53
	See	also	the	letter	of	the	village	chief	of	Fundi	Mwalengo	of	22.02.2016.	
54
	Interview	Banro	Foundation	staff	member,	24.04.2016.	
55
	Email	exchange	former	Banro	community	relations	person,	07.04.2016.	
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In	sum,	there	are	various	ways	in	which	Banro’s	practices	exacerbate	the	conditions	that	are	at	the	
root	of	fragmented	and	fluid	social	mobilization.	While	generating	conflicts	might	seem	inevitable	in	
an	 already	 fractured	 context	 where	 economic	 opportunities	 are	 scarce,	 we	 believe	 that	 company	
management	and	other	staff	do	have	choices.	They	could	for	instance	act	in	a	more	conflict-sensitive	
manner	(e.g.	by	not	taking	obvious	sides	in	an	ongoing	authority	dispute,	or	by	not	threatening	to	sue	
community	 leaders)	 and	 take	 up	 lessons	 learned.	 For	 instance,	 the	 counterproductive	 effects	 of	
repression	 in	Twangiza	did	not	 lead	 to	efforts	 to	avoid	 such	a	 scenario	 in	Namoya.	 In	our	analysis,	
these	actions	and	inactions	bespeak	particular	logics	and	beliefs	–	including	regarding	the	nature	of	
the	population	and	what	 interventions	are	appropriate	and	desirable–	that	are	specific	 to	 the	staff	
members	 in	question.	Being	 in	part	 the	product	of	 individuals’	 views	and	agency,	Banro’s	practices	
could	therefore	have	been	different,	consequently	affecting	social	mobilization	in	different	ways.	
	
6.	Conclusion	
Focusing	on	two	gold	mining	concessions	operated	by	Banro,	this	article	has	examined	the	nature	of	
social	mobilization	 provoked	 by	 industrial	mining	 projects	 in	 the	 eastern	 Congo.	 This	mobilization	
was	 observed	 to	 be	 both	 fluid,	 being	 inconsistent	 and	 unstable,	 and	 fragmented,	 due	 to	 limited	
coordination	 between	 different	 groups	 and	 leaderships,	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 varying	 demands,	
ranging	 from	 rejection	 to	 inclusion.	 Moreover,	 across	 as	 well	 as	 within	 these	 groups,	 attitudes	
towards	the	company	are	informed	by	diverse,	sometimes	seemingly	contradictory,	discourses.		
We	 have	 ascribed	 this	 fragmentation	 and	 fluidity	 to	 three	 factors:	 first,	 those	 internal	 to	 the	
mobilization	effort,	 second,	 the	socio-economic	and	political	 context	and	 third,	 company	practices.	
Drawing	upon	elements	of	resource	mobilization	and	political	opportunity	structure	theory,	we	have	
highlighted	 how	 sustained	 and	 coherent	 mobilization	 is	 undermined	 by	 mobilizing	 groups’	 weak	
organizational	 structures	 and	 limited	 resources;	 and	 a	 context	 marked	 by	 scarce	 livelihood	
possibilities,	 intra-community	 divisions,	 patronage-based	 politics,	 and	 repression.	 However,	 the	
fluidity	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 mobilization	 also	 result	 from	 company	 practices,	 like	 co-optation,	
acquiescence	of	favoritism,	limited	supervision	of	security	personnel,	and	ambiguous	commitment	to	
community	 participation.	 In	 our	 reading,	 the	 literature	 on	 social	 mobilization	 against	 and	 around	
large-scale	 mining	 does	 not	 always	 comprehensively	 discuss	 these	 corporate	 practices,	 which	 are	
enacted	by	individual	staff	members	and	do	not	necessarily	emanate	from	formal	company	policy.	In	
particular,	some	of	this	literature	fails	to	take	into	account	the	full	range	of	company	practices,	which	
include	those	related	to	security,	employment	and	CSR,	and	which	cover	a	broad	spectrum	between	
co-optation	and	(fostering)	 repression.	Moreover,	some	research	does	not	address	company	staff’s	
acquiescence,	 in	 addition	 to	 their	 actions,	 or	 glosses	 over	 the	 contradictory	 effects	 of	 corporate	
practices.	For	 instance,	while	CSR	efforts	may	in	some	contexts	defuse	tensions	(e.g.	Bebbington	et	
al.,	 2008),	 in	our	 case,	 they	 stimulated	 conflicts	 and	 fostered	antipathies	 towards	 the	 company	by	
creating	disillusionment.	Our	analysis	thus	calls	for	a	more	interactionist	approach	to	analyzing	social	
mobilization	 around	 extractivist	 projects,	 which	 looks	 at	 political	 actions	 and	 reactions	 both	 ‘from	
below’	and	‘from	above’,	including	formal	and	informal	practices,	and	the	entire	continuum	between	
resistance/repression	and	collaboration/co-optation.	
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